University of Wyoming College of Law

Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship
Faculty Articles

UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship

12-30-2014

Colorado River Water in Southern California: Evolution of the
Allocation Framework, 1922-2015
Jason Anthony Robison
University of Wyoming College of Law, jrobiso8@uwyo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles

Recommended Citation
Robison, Jason Anthony, "Colorado River Water in Southern California: Evolution of the Allocation
Framework, 1922-2015" (2014). Faculty Articles. 29.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/faculty_articles/29

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the UW College of Law Faculty Scholarship at Law
Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

COLORADO RIVER WATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: EVOLUTION
OF THE ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK,
1922-2015'

JASON

There

A.

ROBISON

was no paucity of vision in secretary of

the interior Ray Lyman Wilbur's statement on July 7, 1930,

announcing the commencement of construction on Boulder
(now Hoover) Dam. Erection of the colossus would, in the
words of the secretary, signify nothing less than "our national
conquest over the Great American Desert." 2 By means of the
dam, the nation would "build a great natural resource . .. make

new geography, and start a new era in the southwestern part
of the United States."3 The secretary's message was bold and
prophetic, as emphatic in its description of the pivotal role

1I am very grateful to Western Legal History for sponsoring the Western History Association conference panel from which this article extends. Many thanks
also to my colleagues on that panel: Donald Pisani, Peter Reich, and Tanis
Thorne. Funding for this article was generously provided from the George
Hopper and Carl M. Williams Faculty Research Funds. Any errors or omissions
are solely my own. This article is dedicated to Rachel St. John, the western
historian who initially fostered my interests as a legal scholar in the Colorado
River Basin, the Law of the River, and the opus of Norris Hundley, Jr.
Ray Lyman Wilbur and Northcutt Ely, The Hoover Dam Power and Water
Contracts and Related Data with IntroductoryNotes (Washington, DC, 1933),
439. For an excellent account of Hoover Dam's construction, see Michael
Hiltzik, Colossus: Hoover Dam and the Making of the American Century
(New York, 2010).
Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Power and Water Contracts,439.

Jason A. Robison is an assistant professor in the University of
Wyoming College of Law. He holds a Doctor of Juridical Science and an LL.M. from Harvard Law School, a J.D. from the
University of Oregon School of Law, and a B.S. in environmental studies from the University of Utah.
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to be played by the dam in regional development as it was in
its account of the vital economic function to be performed by
the dam within Southern California. Imperial Valley would
"no longer be menaced by floods" proclaimed the secretary,
facilitating "new hope and new financial credit to one of the
largest irrigation districts in the West." 4 So, too, would the

dam grow the coastal plain. "By increasing the water supply of
Los Angeles and the surrounding cities, homes and industries
[would be] made possible for many millions of people."I
Signed into law on December 21, 1928, roughly a year-and-ahalf prior to Secretary Wilbur's statement, the Boulder Canyon
Project Act had authorized Hoover Dam's construction and
thereby had given rise to the vision articulated by the secretary
of a "conquered" Colorado River making "new geography" and
dawning a "new era" in the seven western states with portions of territory located in the Colorado River Basin ("Basin
States").6 The Project Act originated at a clutch moment in the
early stages of an evolutionary process that over the next century would generate a labyrinthine legal framework to allocate
and manage the basin's water. This framework is colloquially
called the "Law of the River." In addition to the Project Act,
it embodies an international treaty, two interstate compacts, a
Supreme Court decree issued in the historic case of Arizona v.
California, and dozens of statutes and regulations.7 These nested international, interstate, and intrastate components make
the Law of the River one of the most complex legal regimes of
its kind in the world.
California's use of Colorado River water-or, more precisely,
the evolution of the complex legal framework governing this
water use-can be viewed as progressing in six periods that
track seminal basin-wide, interstate, and intrastate milestones.
Rich themes appear across these periods for citizens, historians, legal scholars, policymakers, and practitioners alike to
consider with regard to the iterative and provisional way in
which water laws evolve and the diverse forms water laws assume. The conclusion examines these themes. As will become
Ibid.
'Ibid.
"Charles Wilkinson has coined the apropos term Big Buildup to refer to the
transformative development facilitated by the Colorado River in the U.S.
Southwest throughout the mid-twentieth century. Charles F. Wilkinson, Fire
on the Plateau: Conflict and Endurance in the American Southwest (Washington, DC, 1999), xii.
Tor a useful overview of the Law of the River, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell,
"Colorado River Basin," in Waters and Water Rights, ed, Robert E. Beck (Dayton, OH, 2009): 5-54.
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evident, California has emerged through the evolutionary
process surveyed below with a relatively secure entitlement to
Colorado River water in modern times-a claim that cannot
be made to a comparable extent by other Basin States. Nearly
40 million people basin-wide rely on the flows associated with
this entitlement,8 and roughly half of this population resides
within Southern California.9 Given this scale of reliance, it is
unsurprising that an unprecedented imbalance between water
supplies and demands now faces the Colorado River Basin.10 A
clear understanding of the evolution and nature of California's
legal rights to Colorado River water is, in this author's view,
essential for addressing future interstate and intrastate tensions
surrounding the coveted flows.
A NASCENT BASIN-WIDE FRAMEWORK
At the base of the allocation framework for Colorado River
water in Southern California is an interstate compact that
underlies the entire Law of the River: the Colorado River
Compact."I Signed by members of the Colorado River Commission on November 24, 1922, the compact was the first
interstate compact formed in U.S. history for purposes of water
allocation. It has been aptly described as the "constitution" of
the Law of the River,' 2 and the varied events that have shaped
California's legal rights to use water from the Colorado River
during the past century uniformly have transpired with the
compact as a backdrop.
'U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin
Water Supply and Demand Study, Study Report (2012), SR-2, http://www.usbr.
gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy.htmL.
9
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin
Stakeholders Moving Forward to Address Challenges Identified in the Colorado
River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, Phase 1 Report (2015), 3-3, http://
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/MovingForward/Phasel Report/
Chpt3.pdf.
"'The Bureau of Reclamation summarized this imbalance as follows in its
lengthy basin study released in December 2012: "Although a range of future
imbalances is plausible, when comparing the median of water supply projections to the median of the water demand projections, the long-term imbalance
in future supply and demand is projected to be about 3.2 maf [million acre-feet)
by 2060." Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study (2012), SR-36.
"The seminal account of the Colorado River Compact's formation remains
Norris Hundley, Jr., Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the
Politics of Water in the American West 2d ed. (Oakland, CA, 2009).
"Robert Adler, "Revisiting the Colorado River Compact: Time for a Change?"
Journalof Land, Resources, and EnvironmentalLaw 28 (2008): 21.
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The compact's genesis can be traced to a resolution passed
by a regional booster organization, the League of the Southwest, at a meeting held in Denver on August 25-27, 1920.13 A
proposal introduced at this meeting by Colorado water lawyer
Delph Carpenter-later hailed as the "Father of Interstate River
Compacts"-called for using the "treaty-making power of the
states" to address the competing legal rights of the Basin States
and the United States to water in the Colorado River and its
tributaries.14 Expressing the league's conviction that these legal
rights should be "settled and determined by compact or agreement between said States and the United States," the resolution requested the appointment of commissioners by the Basin
States' legislatures in order to negotiate a compact or agreement that would subsequently be ratified by those legislatures
and eventually the U.S. Congress.
Myriad events had taken place in the Basin States-particularly, in Southern California-during the first two decades of
the twentieth century leading up to the League of the Southwest's resolution. The essential dynamic stemming from these
events involved allocational tensions between states (and water
users therein) located in the upper versus lower parts of the
Colorado River Basin.
Water users in the Lower Basin gradually had mobilized to
solicit the federal government's assistance with funding and
construction of infrastructure that would ultimately emerge
in the form of Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal. Irrigators in California's Imperial Valley had begun exhausting
the Colorado River's summer flows around the turn of the
century,' 6 and they also had endured devastating floods from
1905 to 1907 that formed the Salton Sea.' 7 Their interests eventually aligned with those of Arthur Powell Davis-director of

"Ray Lyman Wilbur and Northcutt Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents (Washington, DC, 1948), 18.
"Ibid. Delph Carpenter is said "to have suggested the use of the treaty-making
power by the states as a method for settlement of interstate water rights" as
early as 1912. Ibid., 17. For excellent scholarship on Delph Carpenter, see Daniel
Tyler, Silver Fox of the Rockies: Delphus E. Carpenterand Western Water Compacts (Norman, OK, 2003); Daniel Tyler, "Delph E. Carpenter and the Principle
of Equitable Apportionment," Western Legal History 9:1 (1996): 39-53.
'-Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, 18.
"6Norris Hundley, Jr., "The West Against Itself: The Colorado River-An Institutional History," in New Courses for the ColoradoRiver: Major Issues for the
Next Century, ed. Gary D. Weatherford and F. Lee Brown (Albuquerque, NM,
1986), 12.
"William DeBuys and Joan Myers, Salt Dreams: Land & Water in Low-Down
California(Albuquerque, NM, 1999), 63-70.
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'

the U.S. Reclamation Service from 1914 to 1923-to generate
a vociferous call for Lower Basin water infrastructure-specifically, a large-scale dam and reservoir for flood protection and
storage, and a canal system located wholly within the United
States that would run from the Colorado River's mainstem to
the Imperial Valley.II Also notable at this time was Los Angeles'
budding interest, initially expressed in 1920, in utilizing hydropower produced by the dam."
Upstream in the basin's headwaters, the prospect of largescale Lower Basin water infrastructure was viewed with
apprehension, as it presented the possibility that water use
facilitated by this infrastructure would preclude the Upper
Basin states from utilizing the same resources. The western
water law doctrine of prior appropriation was the culprit in this
regard. 2 0 Apportioning water resources among parties according
to temporal priority ("first in time, first in right"), interstate
application of the prior appropriation doctrine portended to
enable water users in the Lower Basin states to secure senior
rights to Colorado River water that would foreclose the exercise of junior rights by parties in the slower-developing Upper
Basin states. Hence Delph Carpenter's proposal. If the Basin
States could agree on a compact that would render prior appropriation inoperative on an interstate scale, such an agreement
would quell Upper Basin concerns about the coveted Lower Basin infrastructure. As summed up by Norris Hundley, Jr., "The
Lower Basin wanted a dam, the Upper Basin wanted protection,
and each concluded they could probably best reconcile their
interests in a compact." 2

"Hundley, "The West Against Itself," 12-13.
1 9Ibid., 13-14.
20
Excellent accounts of the prior appropriation doctrine's history can be found
in Robert Dunbar, ForgingNew Rights in Western Waters (Lincoln, NE, 1983),
59-85; Donald J. Pisani, "Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western Water
Law in the Nineteenth Century," Western HistoricalQuarterly 18:1 (1987):
15-37; Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: Water, Law, and Public
Policy, 1848-1902 (Albuquerque, NM, 1992), 11-38; and Charles W. Wilkinson,
Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the West (Washington, DC, 1992), 231-35.
"Hundley, Water and the West, 108. The state of California described this dynamic similarly thirty years later in its pleadings in Arizona v, California:"The
Upper States. .. objected that if such storage works were built, the additional
rights which would be acquired through priority of appropriation by water users in the lower States would preclude the future expansion of uses by projects
in the Upper Basin." In light of this prospect, "[tihe Upper States insisted that
[their rights for . , . future development be protected before the project was
authorized; and out of this demand came the Colorado River Compact." California's Original Answer in Arizona v. California, 16-17 (May 19, 1953).
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Nearly a year-and-a-half elapsed between passage of the League
of the Southwest's resolution in August 1920 and commencement of compact negotiations in January 1922. From February to
May 1921, each of the Basin States enacted legislation authorizing
these negotiations,22 which was followed by federal legislation in August 1921.2 Congress imposed January 1, 1923, as a
deadline for the compact's ultimate formation, articulating as
the instrument's essential purpose the "equitable division and
apportionment among said States of the water supply of the
Colorado River and of the streams tributary thereto. "24 As reflected in this text, Congress' vision of a state-based allocation
framework for the Colorado River Basin subsequently would
prove infeasible as the negotiations unfolded. All told, in conjunction with the enactment of this enabling legislation over
the course of 1921, state commissioners were appointed for
each of the Basin States," then secretary of commerce Herbert
Hoover was appointed as a federal commissioner, and out of
these appointments emerged the Colorado River Commission
as a negotiating body.
The negotiations that followed the Colorado River Commission's empanelment spanned a roughly ten-month period during 1922, beginning with initial sessions in Washington, D.C.,
in January, and concluding with an intensive series of sessions
in November at Bishop's Lodge outside Santa Fe, New Mexico. 6 Among other notable events propelling these negotiations
was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wyoming v. Colorado on June 5, 1922, which applied the prior appropriation
doctrine to resolve an interstate dispute between these states
over their respective rights to water from the Laramie River.
Unsurprisingly, "the final negotiation of the compact took

'Citations for the state legislation can be found in appendix 202 of Wilbur and
Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents.
"Act of August 19, 1921, ch. 72, 42 Stat. 171.
24

Ibid.

'-The following commissioners were appointed for the respective Basin States:
W.S. Norviel for Arizona, W.F. McClure for California, Delph E. Carpenter for
Colorado, J.G. Scrugham for Nevada, Stephen B. Davis, Jr. for New Mexico,
R.E. Caldwell for Utah, and Frank C. Emerson for Wyoming. Wilbur and Ely,
The Hoover Dam Documents, 19.
"6Colorado River Commission, Minutes and Record of the First Eighteen
Sessions of the Colorado River Commission Negotiating the Colorado River
Compact of 1922 (19221; Colorado River Commission, Minutes and Record of
Sessions Nineteen Thru Twenty Seven of the Colorado River Commission Negotiating the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (1922). An electronic copy of the
negotiation minutes can be found at http://www.riversimulator.org/Resources/
LawOfTheRiver/MinutesColoradoRiverCompact.pdf.
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place in the atmosphere produced by that decision."" "The
doctrine so announced," described Delph Carpenter, "leaves
the Western States to a rivalry and a contest of speed for future
development." 5 Upper Basin states like Colorado had "but one
alternative" under these circumstances-namely, "using every
means to retard development" in Lower Basin states "until the
uses within the upper State have reached their maximum."29
As Carpenter had proposed two years earlier at the League of
the Southwest's Denver meeting, "Itihe States may avoid this
unfortunate situation by determining their respective rights by
interstate compact.",`
But how exactly should this remedy, an interstate water
compact for the Colorado River Basin, be composed? Faced
with an impasse over the viability of a state-based allocation
framework-again, as Congress initially had contemplated
when authorizing the compact negotiations-the commission
had to grapple with an alternative structure for the agreement.
This turning point in the negotiations took place at the commission's eleventh meeting on November 11, 1922, extending
from Delph Carpenter's introduction of a draft compact that
would emerge in modified form a week-and-a-half later as the
Colorado River Compact. 3' The draft compact called for splitting the Colorado River Basin into two divisions, an "Upper
Division" and a "Lower Division," at a point along the Colorado
River's mainstem in northern Arizona called Lee's Ferry (see
figure 1).32 The Upper Division would consist of territory above
Lee's Ferry within the states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, and the Lower Division would consist of territory below Lee's Ferry within the states of Arizona,
California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. In lieu of establishing individual entitlements that would control each state's use
of water from the Colorado River and its tributaries, the draft
compact "equitably divided and apportioned" this water by imposing two flow obligations on the Upper Division states, with
2'Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, 22.
"'This statement from Commissioner Carpenter regarding Wyoming v. Colorado and its relation to the compact appeared in a report submitted to Colorado
governor Oliver Henry Shoup on December 15, 1922. A copy of this report can
be found in appendix 210 of Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents,

A97-A98.
2

bid., A98.

a0lbid.
"This draft compact appears in Colorado River Commission, Minutes of the
Eleventh Meeting (November 11, 1922), 13--20.
2
A
Ibid., 14.
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FIGURE I. Colorado River Basin and Adjacent Export Areas (Courtesy of
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River
Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, Study Report [20121,SR-10)
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Arizona excepted.3 These states would commit to (1) avoiding depleting the "average annual flow of the Colorado River at

Lee's Ferry over any period of ten (10) consecutive years" below
6,264,000 acre-feet, and (2) augmenting these minimum average
flows by "an amount of water equivalent to one-half the annual
requirement for delivery to the Republic of Mexico."

34

As embodied in Delph Carpenter's draft compact, the twodivision allocation framework for the Colorado River Basin
ultimately would prove precedential as mentioned above.
Before turning to its adoption, however, we will highlight two
additional aspects of its genesis.
As an initial matter, the origin of the two-division framework appears to have predated Delph Carpenter's introduction
of the draft compact on November 11, 1922, by at least two
years and perhaps longer. According to Sims Ely, who served
on the League of the Southwest's subcommittee from which
Carpenter's compact proposal issued in August 1920, Carpenter
"outlined not only the general scheme of an interstate compact" at that time, but also "a basis for division between the
four upper States, as one group, and the three lower States, as
another. "5 On his own account, Carpenter described the twodivision framework at the eleventh meeting as having been
"advanced before this Commission by Director Davis" (i.e.,
Arthur Powell Davis) in an earlier form that involved a division point below the mouth of the San Juan River.36 Arizona
commissioner W.S. Norviel likewise attributed the two-division "principle" to a study "prepared by the Geological Survey
in connection with the Reclamation Service." 3 What appears

clear from the historical record is that, as Norris Hundley, Jr.,
graciously put it, Herbert Hoover's memory was "playing tricks
on him" when he later claimed credit for the two-division idea
in his memoirs in 1951.38
In a related vein, it also should be noted that, although the
two-division framework of Delph Carpenter's draft compact
ended up having staying power, this allocational approach was
not the only one envisioned for the Colorado River Basin. The
state-based model reflected in Congress' enabling legislation
was an obvious alternative if an acceptable basis for calculat33Ibid., 15.
"Ibid., 15-16.
-"Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Darn Documents, 18.
6Colorado River Commission, Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, 39.
'Ibid., 47.
"Hundley, Water and the West, 182.
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ing the respective states' water rights (e.g., irrigable acreage)
could be agreed upon by the commissioners. Since no such basis
could be found, however, this dynamic favored the two-division
framework, notwithstanding concerns expressed by some of
the commissioners at the eleventh meeting.39 New Mexico
commissioner Stephen B. Davis, Jr., was noticeably hesitant in
this regard, viewing a state-based approach as "contemplated
by the law under which we are constituted.. . ." There must
be a definite allocation as among the individual states rather
than among the groups," he opined.4 1 "All that I see in the
group idea. . . is that we shove off to the future that much
responsibility. 4 2 Arizona commissioner Norviel offered similar
remarks, indicating that a two-division approach was not what
the commission had been "appointed for," and that such an approach would fail to "arrive at any conclusion" and leave "the
two divisions to work out their own salvation on whatever plan
they may choose in the future."4 - Yet Delph Carpenter was not
alone in suggesting that a two-division framework was desirable as
a pragmatic matter. Utah commissioner R.E. Caldwell also introduced a draft compact at the eleventh meeting that entailed dividing the basin into an Upper Basin and a Lower Basin for purposes of
a basin-wide apportionment." To these two proposals were added
distinct compacts offered by Commissioner Norviel and the city
attorney of Long Beach, California, George L. Hoodenpyl. 5
Thus, at the end of the day, the interstate compact formed
by the commission on November 24, 1922-a little more than
a month before the end-of-year deadline-did not fully comport
with Congress' aspiration for an instrument that would effect "an equitable division and apportionment" of water from
the Colorado River system among the individual Basin States.
Instead, the most the commission was able to accomplish

3

"Wyoming commissioner Frank C. Emerson described the impasse over the
state-based model as follows in his post-negotiation report to Wyoming governor William B. Ross and the Wyoming legislature: "After extended consideration this plan was found to be impractical by reason of the facts that accurate
determination could not now be made as to the possibilities of development
in the different States, and agreement could not be reached upon any relative
figures." This report appears in appendix 214 of Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover
Dam Documents.

*Colorado River Commission, Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, 45.
"'Ibid, 33.
'Ibid.
-lbid., 34.
44Ibid., 26-28.
-Ibid., 4-9, 56.
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was to craft an apportionment scheme that aimed at this goal
of equity in a manner closely resembling that of Delph Carpenter's draft. As shown above in figure 1, this scheme split
the basin into an "Upper Basin" and a "Lower Basin" at Lee's
Ferry. The Upper Basin encompassed parts of Colorado, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, plus a small section of northeastern Arizona. The Lower Basin extended primarily to parts
of Arizona, California, and Nevada, with particular sections of
New Mexico and Utah also included. To a similar effect, the
compact designated Arizona, California, and Nevada as the
"Lower Division" states, and Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,
and Wyoming as the "Upper Division" states.
Considered in relation to Southern California's legal rights
to Colorado River water, the upshot of the compact was at
least threefold:4 6 First, given California's location within the
Lower Basin, Article 11(a) of the compact authorized California
to share in the beneficial consumptive use of 7.5 million acrefeet (maf) of water per year from the Colorado River system,
an amount apportioned to the Lower Basin as a whole without individual state entitlements. Article 111(b) authorized an
additional 1.0 maf of such use annually. One acre-foot equals
325,851 gallons of water.4 1 Second, mirroring Delph Carpenter's
draft, the compact in Article 111(d) proscribed the Upper Division states from depleting mainstream flows at Lee's Ferry below a specified level, 75.0 maf, during any consecutive ten-year
period. This critical obligation secured the primary source of
flows within the Lower Colorado River on which California
water users would rely. Third, and cutting the other way, Article 11(c) of the compact also obligated California and the other
Lower Division states to contribute half of the flows needed
to satisfy any future treaty entitlement recognized for Mexico,
if surplus waters were unavailable for this purpose. It is imperative to highlight that the nascent basin-wide framework
outlined by these four paragraphs of Article III was founded on
an erroneous estimate of 16.4 maf of average annual Lee's Ferry
flows that had been reported by the Bureau of Reclamation
based on limited data." The commissioners' "strong desire" to
form a compact caused them not to challenge the accuracy of

46

An electronic copy of the compact can be accessed on the website of the
Bureau of Reclamation's Lower Colorado River Regional Office at https://www.
usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompet~pdf.
4
?United States Geological Survey, Water Science Glossary of Terms (2014),
http://water.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html.
"Hundley, "The West Against Itself," 18.
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this figure,49 however, and several commissioners actually presumed even higher flow estimates.5 0 Nearly one hundred years
later, the historical record reveals that average annual Lee's
Ferry flows have been approximately 15.0 maf.6 1 Nonetheless,
"the consequences of the compact remain with us."-CONDITION PRECEDENT:

A

CEILING FOR CALIFORNIA

Signing of the compact by the esteemed members of the
Colorado River Commission did not contemporaneously result
in the instrument's entry into force. Both federal and state
ratification of the compact had to be obtained moving forward
from Bishop's Lodge. Extending from the signing ceremony in
November 1922, a roughly six-and-a-half-year ratification process ensued, culminating in a proclamation by newly elected
president Herbert Hoover of the Boulder Canyon Project Act's
effectiveness on June 25, 1929. It was during this prolonged
ratification process that the U.S. Congress inserted text into
the Project Act conditioning federal ratification of the compact
on the imposition of a ceiling on California's use of Colorado
River water. This ceiling delineated the pool of water available to agricultural and municipal water users within Southern
California, although it would not be until four decades later in
Arizona v. California(1963) that the ceiling's precise contours
would become fully clear.
Ratification of the compact as a seven-state equitable apportionment of water from the Colorado River system was not
a protracted process in most of the Basin States following the
negotiations. From January to April 1923, six states enacted
ratification legislation, including California, Colorado, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.53 Unable to follow suit at
this time, however, was California's neighbor to the east: Ari-

"Ibid.

"For example, Colorado commissioner Delph Carpenter, Utah commissioner
R.E. Caldwell, and Wyoming commissioner Frank E. Emerson all estimated
average annual Lee's Ferry flows of more than 18.0 maf in post-negotiation
reports to their respective state governors and legislatures. Copies of these
reports appear in appendix 210 (Carpenter), appendix 213 (Caldwell), and appendix 214 (Emerson) of Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents.
"U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin
Water Supply and Demand Study, Technical Report B-Water Supply Assessment (2012), B-22, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy.html.
'2 Hundley, Water and the West, 352.
"'Wilburand Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, 35.
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zona. The Arizona legislature considered a slew of ratification
measures in early 1923, including, as the last in this line, a bill
introduced in the Arizona House in March 1923 calling for unconditional ratification. This bill failed by a tie vote of 22-22,
however, and "[bly this margin the Compact was subjected to
a quarter century of conflict." 4 Arizona ultimately would not
ratify the instrument until 1944.
The Basin States' lack of unanimity regarding the compact
led to attempts at a workaround and varied efforts to bring
Arizona into the fold. Delph Carpenter lobbied from 1923 to
1925 for ratification of the compact as a six-state agreement,
but these efforts were only partly successful. A similar result
followed from a governors' conference held in Denver in 1927
to facilitate seven-state ratification. Arizona and California
rejected a proposal made by the Upper Division states' governors at this conference for an apportionment of water from the
Colorado River system among the Lower Division states. 5
Paralleling the ratification processes in the Basin States'
legislatures was the federal ratification process in the U.S.
Congress-a process subjected to the fate of a series of four
bills introduced between 1922 and 1927 by Representative Phil
Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson of California ("Swing-Johnson
bills"). Each of these bills called for congressional authorization of the Lower Basin water infrastructure that had animated
the compact negotiations: a large-scale dam and storage reservoir, and the All-American Canal. It was the fourth of the
Swing-Johnson bills that sealed this deal.56 Signed into law by
President Coolidge on December 21, 1928, the Boulder Canyon
Project Act was devised with the Imperial Valley and Southern
California coastal plain as major beneficiaries.
Although the Project Act conferred congressional approval
on the compact, it was a nuanced blessing to be sure. Congress'
ratification hinged on the Project Act's taking legal effect,
which in turn was conditioned, in section 4 of the act, on one
of two scenarios. On one hand, the Basin States could unanimously ratify the compact and thereby render the Project Act
effective. On the other hand, if unanimous ratification proved
impossible within six months of the Project Act's enactment,
six-state ratification also could bring the act into effect, so long
as California was one of the ratifying states and its legislature
35-36.
Ibid, 37-38.

6#Ibid.,

5

*6An electronic copy of the Project Act can be accessed on the website of the
Bureau of Reclanation's Lower Colorado River Regional Office at http://www.
usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/bcpact.pdf.
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would agree to the imposition of a ceiling on the state's annual
use of Colorado River water. That ceiling was set at "four million four hundred thousand acre-feet of the waters apportioned
to the Lower Basin States by paragraph (a) of Article III of the
Colorado River compact, plus not more than one-half of any
excess or surplus waters unapportioned by said compact."-"
Accompanying the Project Act's provisions conferring federal ratification and limiting California's water use were others
that proved equally significant in later years. Although the invitation was declined, Congress authorized the Lower Division
states to enter into an agreement that would have apportioned
to Arizona and Nevada, respectively, the consumptive use of
2.8 maf and 300,000 acre-feet of the 7.5 maf apportioned to the
Lower Basin by Article III(a) of the compact. Of equal importance, Congress provided that any storage and delivery of water
in and from the reservoir authorized by the Project Act (Lake
Mead) for use in the Lower Division states would be permitted
only under contracts formed with the secretary of the interior
for this purpose. Congress similarly hinged appropriations for
the construction of Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal
on the secretary of the interior's forming water contracts, and
related contracts for hydropower, deemed adequate to ensure
repayment of this infrastructure within fifty years.
Given Arizona's recalcitrance toward the compact at this
time, the Basin States were forced to secure federal ratification
(and the coveted Lower Basin infrastructure) via the six-state
ratification option in the Project Act. California's ratification
was the last to fall into place during the six-month period
following the statute's passage on December 21, 1928." This
ratification occurred on March 4, 1929, the same date on
which the California legislature satisfied the second condition
precedent in the Project Act by enacting the California Limitation Act.6 9 The 4.4 maf limitation agreed to in this act incorporated the text quoted above in section 4 of the Project Act.
With these two pieces of the statutory puzzle in place, and the
requisite six-month period having passed, the former chairman
and federal commissioner of the Colorado River Commission,

"Ibid.
"'Citations to the basin state legislatures' ratifications of the compact as a sixstate agreement can be found in appendix 501 of Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover
Dam Documents.
"A copy of the California Limitation Act can be found in appendix 502 of
Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents.
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President Herbert Hoover, proclaimed the Project Act effective
as of June 25, 1929.60
APPORTIONING CALIFORNIA'S SHARE
OF COLORADO RIVER WATER

President Hoover's proclamation of the Boulder Canyon

Project Act's effectiveness thus simultaneously brought into
effect the compact's basin-wide allocation framework and
laid the foundation for an intrastate framework to take shape
within California across the next decade. At the core of this
intrastate scheme was the ceiling on annual Colorado River
water use agreed to by California in the Project Act and the
Limitation Act: 4.4 maf of the waters apportioned to the Lower
Basin by "paragraph (a) of Article III of the Colorado River
compact, plus not more than one-half of any excess or surplus
waters unapportioned by said compact." Southern California
agricultural and municipal water users had to reach consensus
about how the Colorado River water subsumed within this
limitation would be parsed out among them. Moreover, in light
of the Project Act's contractual requirements for water storage
and delivery, the secretary of the interior necessarily would
play a major role in the negotiation and formation of California's intrastate framework and contracts effectuating it.
Initial attempts to devise an intrastate framework for Colorado River water in Southern California took place roughly six
months after the Boulder Canyon Project Act had gone into
effect so as to impose the California limitation. Agricultural
groups and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) formed a preliminary agreement for this purpose
on February 21, 1930.61 This agreement served as a valuable
precedent to be sure, but it involved a loose allocation scheme
that classified Colorado River water into three categories and
apportioned 4.95 maf of it in specified amounts between the
"Agricultural groups" collectively and the MWD individually.
Two months passed between the formation of this agreement
and the secretary of the interior's adoption of initial regulations
for water contracts on April 23, 1930. The secretary formed

"Ibid., 42. A copy of President Hoover's proclamation declaring the Project Act
effective can be found in appendix 503 of this source.
61

Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, appendix 1001.
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the first such contract on the same date-a contract with the
MWD for 1.05 maf of Colorado River water per year.62
The "necessity of a more definite division of the California
water" than that provided in the preliminary agreement became
increasingly apparent in subsequent negotiations over contracts
pertaining to the All-American Canal." On November 5, 1930,
the secretary of the interior submitted a formal request for such
specificity to California contractors, including the Imperial Irrigation District, MWD, Coachella Valley County Water District, and Palo Verde Irrigation District (see figure 2).64 Included
with this request was a draft recommendation for an intrastate
allocation scheme that was prescient when considered in relation to later conflicts in which these parties would become
ensnared. Two features of this framework were remarkable.
First, it categorized the water available to the contractors into
three classifications rooted in the compact's apportionment
scheme-namely, Article III(a) water, Article 111(b) water, and
"water which may be available to California over and above
the foregoing." Second, while leaving blank the respectively
permitted amounts of water use, the framework called for
establishing water use entitlements for individual contractors,
rather than lumping contractors into groups (e.g., an "Agricultural group") that would share collective entitlements as the
preliminary agreement had done.
Yet the secretary's recommended framework ultimately
would not see the light of day. California contractors did oblige
the secretary's request for more specificity by engaging in
nine months of negotiations regarding the intrastate allocation
scheme. Emerging on August 18, 1931, as the Seven-Party Agreement, however, the final version of this framework only partially remedied the shortcomings of the preliminary agreement. 6
Table I and figure 3 below summarize the Seven-Party Agreement's intrastate system of allocation priorities for Colorado

6

lbid., appendix 1007.
'Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Power and Water Contracts, 32.
'Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, appendix 1002. Figure 2 identifies the respective geographic areas that fall within these contractors' boundaries. Their titles are abbreviated as acronyms.
'An electronic copy of the Seven-Party Agreement can be accessed on the
website of the Bureau of Reclamation's Lower Colorado River Regional Office
at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ca7pty.pdf.
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FIGURE 2. Hydrologic Basin and Export Areas in California (Courtesy
of U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado
River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study, Appendix C-7,
California Water Demand Scenario Quantification [20121, C7-2)
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River water in Southern California. 6 6 Among other salient features, this scheme authorized contractors to collectively consume 3.85 maf of Colorado River water per year under priorities one through three, but failed to specify the amounts of use
permitted for each contractor individually. Also notable is the
fact that the MWD's and San Diego's entitlements to 662,000
acre-feet of water use in priority five attached to "excess or
surplus waters" within the meaning of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act and the Limitation Act. As discussed earlier, both
acts restricted California from using more than 4.4 maf per year
of the water apportioned to the Lower Basin by Article 1(a) of
the compact, while affording California the use of up to "onehalf of any excess or surplus waters unapportioned by [the]
Compact"-i.e., assuming such excess or surplus waters indeed
were available. The MWD's exercise of its 550,000 acre-feet entitlement in priority four alone, however, would bring California's

collective water use to the 4.4 maf level-i.e., before accounting
for the priority five entitlements-when combined with the 3.85
maf of water use authorized in priorities one through three. As
we shall see, these and related aspects of the Seven-Party Agreement would prove divisive in later decades.
Incorporated into amended general regulations adopted

by the secretary of the interior on September 28, 193 1,67 the
Seven-Party Agreement would control the terms of water contracts subsequently formed by the secretary with the California
contractors between 1931 and 1934.61 The secretary executed
a revised version of the MWD's 1930 contract-conforming it
to the Seven-Party Agreement-contemporaneously with the
adoption of the amended regulations. Following suit in 1932 was
a contract with the Imperial Irrigation District for water deliveries through, and construction of, the All-American Canal. The
Palo Verde Irrigation District and the city of San Diego similarly formed delivery contracts in 1933, the latter calling for
deliveries from, and associated capacity in, the canal. Last but
not least among these parties was the Coachella Valley County
Water District, which executed a water contract in 1934 that
','Table 1 appears in Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, 107. It was
produced in 1948 by secretary of the interior Ray Lyman Wilbur, who served
in this position at the time of the Seven-Party Agreement's formation, and his
assistant Northcutt Ely, who later litigated the principal case of Arizona v.
California on California's behalf in 1963.
"7Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Dam Documents, appendix 1005.
6'Ibid., Metropolitan Water District (appendix 1008), Imperial Irrigation District
(appendix 1106), Palo Verde Irrigation District (appendix 1006), San Diego
(appendix 1009), Coachella Valley County Water District (appendix 1108). No
contract was formed for the Yuma Project.
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resembled San Diego's by obligating the secretary to deliver

Colorado River water through, and provide associated capacity
in, the Aci-American Canal.
It was by means of the Seven-Party Agreement and the

contracts just outlined that Southern California apportioned
its interstate share of Colorado River water-as circumscribed
by the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the Limitation Acton an intrastate basis during the five-year period after the

Project Act had taken effect. Minor clarifications and tweaks
would be made to this intrastate framework in the 1930s and
1940s, including folding of San Diego's water contract into
the MWD's in 1946 .69 Alongside the compact and the Project
Act, the intrastate framework also would survive three unsuccessful lawsuits brought by Arizona against California in the
Supreme Court during the 1930s.10 Upon Arizona's eventual
ratification of the compact in 1944, however, sustained efforts
were put into motion within that state to increase its use of
Colorado River water through an extensive canal system comparable in scale to the All-American Canal. Just as adoption of
the compact's basin-wide framework had been a prerequisite
to the Project Act's enactment, so too would clarification of
Arizona's and California's respective rights to Colorado River
water be necessary before Arizona's plans could be realized.
The principle case of Arizona v. Californiaemerged at this

'Ibid., appendix 1012.

"These lawsuits included

Arizona v California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Arizona v
California,292 U.S. 341 (1934), and Arizona v, California,298 U.S. 558 (1936).
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Various schemes for constructing a canal system to route

water from the Colorado River to central Arizona had been proposed for several decades prior to the Bureau of Reclamation's
unveiling of the Central Arizona Project (CAP) in December
1 947.71 Consuming the next twenty years, Arizona's quest for
congressional authorization of the CAP, and for secure title to
the Colorado River water that would flow through the project,
entailed monumental repercussions for the Lower Basin interstate allocation scheme and California's intrastate framework.
nHundley, Water and the West, 299-300.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Californiain 1963
would distinguish the Colorado River Basin as the supposed
site of the first congressional apportionment in U.S. history
based on a majority of the Court's interpretation of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act. That interpretation would definitively
delineate California's interstate share of Colorado River water
under the Project Act and the Limitation Act, despite the fact
that the Seven-Party Agreement and associated water contracts
already had been formed three decades earlier.
Eight years elapsed between Arizona's ratification of the
compact on February 24, 1944, and the onset of Arizona v.
Californiain the Supreme Court. Arizona's ratification followed on the heels of a treaty formed by the United States
and Mexico three weeks prior that had established the latter
sovereign's legal right to use 1.5 maf of Colorado River water
annually 2 One week after this treaty was formed, Arizona
entered into a water contract with the secretary of the interior
for annual deliveries of 2.8 maf of Colorado River water.7 3 Federal authorization and construction of the CAP infrastructure
would be necessary to utilize a portion of this water through
the project, however, and stern opposition from California in
Congress ultimately would keep Arizona from this goal. On
April 18, 1951, the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs adopted a resolution postponing consideration of any
bills related to the CAP "until such time as use of water in the
Lower Colorado River Basin is either adjudicated or binding or
mutual agreement as to the use of the water is reached by the
States of the lower Colorado River Basin." 7 4
Arizona pursued the adjudication route contemplated in the
committee's resolution, filing its original complaint with the
Supreme Court on August 8, 1952, and thereby commencing
one of the most epic lawsuits in the history of western water

nAn electronic copy of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty can be accessed on the website
of the Bureau of Reclamation's Lower Colorado River Regional Office at http://
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf. For a thorough account of
the treaty's formation, see Hundley, Dividing the Waters: A Century of Con-

troversy Between the United States and Mexico

(Berkeley, CA, 1966).

'"Wilbur and Ely, The Hoover Darn Documents, appendix 1016.

"See HearingsBefore the Committee on Interiorand Insular Affairs, House
of Representatives, 82d Cong.,
1501, part 2, pp. 739-61.

1s,

Sess. JApril 18, 1951), on H.R. 1500 and H.R.
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law.75 Arizona's complaint prayed that the state's "title to the
annual beneficial consumptive use of 3,800,000 acre-feet of the
water apportioned to the Lower Basin by the Colorado River
Compact be forever confirmed and quieted." 76 Arizona also
requested that California's title "be fixed and forever limited
to 4,400,000 acre-feet." 7 7 Arizona argued that both the SevenParty Agreement and the contracts formed by the secretary of
the interior based on it were illegal and invalid to the extent
that they exceeded this limit by apportioning 5,362,000 maf of
Colorado River water per year." California, of course, sharply
disputed these and related arguments in its answer, characterizing Arizona's position as an attempt "to obtain water for
[the CAP] by taking it from existing and operating California
projects." 9 California allegedly had developed these projects
in reliance on interpretations of the Colorado River Compact
and the Boulder Canyon Project Act that allowed for 5.362
maf of annual Colorado River water use within the state."o In
particular, the MWD would not have accepted its 550,000-acrefeet entitlement in priority five of the Seven-Party Agreement
("a low priority") under interpretations of the compact and the
Project Act being proffered by Arizona.,"
These initial arguments touched only the tip of the iceberg
concerning the wide range of issues, and the parties' evolving
positions with regard to these issues, that emerged throughout
the litigation. Eventually drawing the case to a close, the Supreme Court issued its opinion on June 3, 1963, nearly eleven
years after Arizona had filed its complaint. 2 As canvassed by
the Court, the proceedings ultimately encompassed the appointment of two special masters; a roughly two-year trial
with 340 witnesses, thousands of exhibits, and 25,000 pages of
transcripts; a 433-page report and recommended decree from
the second special master; and extensive briefing as well as
7

"Seminal articles discussing and critiquing this landmark case include Hundley,
"Clio Nods: Arizona v. California and the Boulder Canyon Project Act-A Reassessment," Western Historical Quarterly3 (1972): 17-51; Charles J. Meyers,
"The Colorado River," Stanford Law Review 19 (1967): 1-75; Frank J. Trelease,
"Arizona v. California:Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and
Nation," Supreme Court Review 1963 (1963): 158-205.
7
Arizona Bill of Complaint 30 (August 8, 1952).
"Ibid.
7Ibid., 16-18.
"California Answer of Defendants to Bill of Complaint 2, 69-70 (May 19, 1953).
51
%id., 39-40, 44-45, 60-61.
"Ibid., Exhibit A, 2.
"Arizona v. California,373 U.S. 546 (1963).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2543629

SUMMER/FALL 2014

COLORADo RiVER WATER

161

two oral arguments (sixteen hours and more than six hours in
length, respectively) before the Court., The Court's final opinion was a split one to boot, including two lengthy dissents.8 4
A variety of holdings fell within the majority opinion issued in Arizona v. California,but most pivotal among them
for Southern California's use of Colorado River water was that
Congress had established a statutory apportionment in the
Lower Basin when enacting the Boulder Canyon Project Act.
According to the majority, "Congress in passing the Project
Act intended to and did create its own comprehensive scheme
for the apportionment among Arizona, California, and Nevada
of the Lower Basin's share of the mainstream waters of the
Colorado River, leaving each State its tributaries."8, As further
construed by the majority, "Congress decided that a fair division of the first 7,500,000 acre-feet of such mainstream waters would give 4,400,000 acre-feet to California, 2,800,000 to
Arizona, and 300,000 to Nevada; Arizona and California would
each get one-half of any surplus."

6

The majority's holding

responded to voluminous briefing submitted by the parties regarding Congress' intended meaning in section 4 of the Project
Act, particularly the limitation imposed on California's use of
Colorado River water. In the final analysis, the Court rejected
California's constructions of this provision, despite the state's
repeated assertions that it had relied on these interpretations
when previously adopting the Limitation Act and the SevenParty Agreement.
The Court issued its original decree in Arizona v. Californiain
8
This decree vested the secre1964 to implement its decision?.
tary of the interior with discretion to determine the amount of
Colorado River water that would be released from Lake Mead
-ibid., 551.
"One of these dissents was from Justice William 0. Douglas. It offered as
pointed a critique of the majority opinion as any subsequent academic commentary. In Justice Douglas' words, "Much is written these days about judicial
lawmaking; and every scholar knows that judges who construe statutes must
of necessity legislate interstitially, to paraphrase Mr. Justice Cardozo. . . . The
present case is different. It will, I think, be marked as the baldest attempt by
judges in modern times to spin their own philosophy into the fabric of the law,
in derogation of the will of the legislature." Ibid., 628.
"Ibid., 565.
"1Ibid.
"An electronic copy of the Court's original decree can be accessed on the
website of the Bureau of Reclamation's Lower Colorado River Regional Office
at htti://wwwusbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/supctdec.pdf. The Court issued
a consolidated version of its decree in 2006, which also can be found on this
website at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2006/
decree/06Decree.pdf.
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for consumptive use in the Lower Division states each year.
During normal conditions, releases sufficient to enable 7.5 maf
of consumptive use would be allocated according to the interstate scheme noted above: 4.4 maf to California, 2.8 maf to
Arizona, and 300,000 acre-feet to Nevada. Years during which
surplus was available to facilitate more than 7.5 maf of consumptive use would involve a 50/50 split of the surplus between
Arizona and California (with a potential 4-percent cut for Nevada
out of Arizona's share). When less than 7.5 maf of constunptive
use was possible-i.e., in shortage conditions-the secretary was
given guidelines to abide by when allocating the available water,
including ensuring no more than 4.4 maf would be apportioned
for use in California. An equally notable provision of the decree
authorized the secretary to allocate apportioned but unused water
from one Lower Division state to another on an annual basis,
with no recurrent rights to this water accruing.
Four years elapsed between the Court's issuance of its decree
in Arizona v. Californiaand Congress' enactment of legislation
finally authorizing the CAP-namely, the Colorado River Basin
Project Act-in 1968.18 In addition to authorizing the project,
this legislation contained a key provision bearing on California's legal rights to use water from the Lower Colorado River
after Arizona v. California. Section 301 of the act restricted
Arizona from diverting any water into the CAP during shortages (as defined by the decree) if doing so would preclude 4.4 maf
of consumptive use in California in the particular year. That
is, after two decades of heated struggle, including eleven years
before the Supreme Court and its special masters, Congress
ultimately subordinated Arizona's CAP entitlement to California's 4.4 maf normal entitlement in the event of shortages
in the Lower Basin. With this post-litigation development, the
stage was set for contemporary refinements to the intrastate
and interstate allocation schemes governing California's use of
the Colorado River.
PATCHWORK ON THE INTRASTATE ALLOCATION

Congress' authorization of the CAP in 1968 led, unsurprisingly, to increased use of Colorado River water within the
Lower Basin, as the project gradually began operation two
decades after the principal decision in Arizona v. California.
"An electronic copy of the Colorado River Basin Project Act can be accessed
on the website of the Bureau of Reclamation's Lower Colorado River Regional
Office at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crbproj.pdf.
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This increased water use in Arizona (and Nevada also) posed
a crucial issue that largely has defined Southern California's
relationship with the Colorado River in modern times: what
measures would the state need to employ to live within the 4.4
maf entitlement announced by the Court for normal conditions? In 2011, Justice Ronald Robie of the California Court of
Appeals succinctly described Arizona v. California'simplications for the state's intrastate allocation framework in this
regard: "While the United States Supreme Court largely settled
the interstate conflict over water nearly 50 years ago . . . the

court's resolution of the dispute between the states-which
limited California's share of the river to far less than the state
can use-ensured the fight would continue within the state for
years to come."" Justice Robie's remark stemmed from protracted litigation over an agreement called the Quantification
Settlement Agreement ("QSA") that had been forged in 2003 by
various parties to the predecessor Seven-Party Agreement. As
of the time of this writing, the QSA litigation finally appears
positioned to conclude after a dozen years, although this milestone emerges amidst significant parallel developments that
intertwine the future of the QSA with that of the Salton Sea.
Notwithstanding these developments and the lengthy litigation trail, the QSA currently serves as the primary instrument
for refining California's intrastate allocation scheme in a manner that complies with the 4.4 maf normal entitlement secured
in Arizona v. California.
Commencement of CAP deliveries in 1985 markedly influenced the interstate allocation of Colorado River water among
the Lower Division states as well as the intrastate allocation
of this water within Southern California.90 Arizona's use of
Colorado River water had ranged from roughly 1.0 to 1.4 maf
per year from 1971 to 1985, and this figure jumped to approximately 2.25 maf within a decade after CAP deliveries began.
Nevada's use of Colorado River water-although unrelated to
the CAP-likewise more than doubled (from roughly 100,000
to 225,000 acre-feet) across this period. Distinguished from Arizona and Nevada, California's use of Colorado River water consistently exceeded the state's 4.4 maf normal entitlement over
this timeframe, falling at or above 5.0 maf during several years.
The secretary of the interior enabled California's consumption
"Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201

Cal. App. 411 758, 772

(2011) (emphasis in original).

"U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Basin
Water Supply and Demand Study, Appendix C 10, Historical Consumptive Use
and Loss Detail by State (2012), CI0-12 to C1O-18, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/
region/programs/crbstudy.html.
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at this level with deliveries of surplus water and water apportioned to, but unused in, Arizona and Nevada. This pattern
could not persist once the CAP entered the scene. As described
by the Colorado River Water Board of California many years
later: "With the commencement of CAP deliveries in 1985,
California's dependable supply from the Colorado River was
reduced to its basic apportionment of 4.4 maf per year. "91
Roughly two decades passed between the onset of CAP
deliveries in 1985 and the formation of an intrastate agreement
in 2003 aimed at enabling California to live within its 4.4 maf
normal entitlement-again, the QSA. A variety of interstate
and intrastate efforts preceded the QSA's adoption.92 As an
initial development, the Imperial Irrigation District and the
MWD formed an agreement in December 1988 whereby the
MWD agreed to fund $10 million of conservation measures in
the district annually in exchange for the transfer of 100,000
acre-feet of conserved water (RID-MWD transfer).93 Although
this agreement would promote efficient use of California's
Colorado River water budget, it also raised concerns about
whether the transfer would violate higher-priority entitlements
of the Palo Verde Irrigation District and the Coachella Valley
Water District under the Seven-Party Agreement. A follow-up
agreement with these water agencies in 1989 navigated these
concerns,94 but a 1992 letter from the Bureau of Reclamation
addressed a critical issue raised by them: the need to quantify
entitlements held by parties under the first three priorities
of the Seven-Party Agreement. 5 Included in this letter was a
proposal from the bureau to accomplish this formidable task,
which was considered essential for future intrastate transfers
and for curbing excess water use.

"Colorado River Board of California, California's Colorado River Water Use
Plan (2000) (emphasis added), 16, http://www.crb.ca.gov/programs/CalifPlan_
May 11-Draft.pdf.
'A detailed discussion of interstate efforts underlying the QSA's formation can
be found in James S. Lochhead, "An Upper Basin Perspective on California's
Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part II: The Development, Implementation and Collapse of California's Plan to Live Within Its Basic Apportionment," University of Denver Water Law Review 6 (2003): 318.

'U.S. Department of the Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement,
Implementation Agreement, Inadvertent Overrun and Payback Policy, and
Related Federal Actions (2012), 2-13 to 2-14, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
g4000/FEIS/Volume%20.pdf.
"Ibid.
"Robert J. Towles, regional director, Bureau of Reclamation Lower Colorado
Regional Office to Gerald M. Davisson, manager, Palo Verde Irrigation District,
December 10, 1992.
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The bureau's 1992 quantification proposal ultimately fell
flat, but it set a precedent for related measures that appeared
across the decade. Spurring these developments was a 1996 address by secretary of the interior Bruce Babbitt indicating that
California must develop a strategy to limit its Colorado River
water use to 4.4 maf annually (the normal entitlement) and
means to meet its water needs without jeopardizing Colorado
River water use in other states.9' Two years elapsed between
this address and a subsequent water conservation and transfer
agreement formed by the Imperial Irrigation District and San
Diego County Water Association (SDCWA) involving "the
largest agricultural-to-urban water transfer in United States
history"-a transfer of 300,000 acre-feet of conserved water
annually (IID-SDCWA transfer).9 7 This transfer later would be
modified-divvying out 200,000 acre-feet of the conserved water to the SDCWA and 100,000 acre-feet to either the Coachella
Valley Water District or the MWD-but both it and the predecessor IID-MWD transfer were incorporated into a path-breaking
"Key Terms Agreement" formed in 1999 by the state of California, the Imperial Irrigation District, the Coachella Valley Water
District, and the MWD.95 This agreement laid the groundwork
for the QSA and outlined many of its eventual features, including quantifying the parties' entitlements under the Seven-Party
Agreement and authorizing the two water transfers.
It would take four years, from October 1999 to October 2003,
for the Key Terms Agreement to evolve into the QSA, and this
critical period would be marked by the formation of two important documents. Released by the Colorado River Water Board of
California in 2000, the first document was the "California 4.4
Plan," which was tailored to the water budget goal articulated
by Secretary Babbitt in 1996 and sought in earnest by the other
Basin States since at least the early 1990s.99 "There is a fundamental change in the availability and use of Colorado River
9'Address by Bruce Babbitt, secretary of the interior, to Colorado River Water
Users Association 1996 Annual Conference (December 19, 1996), http://www.
sci.sdsu.edu/salton/secr-babbitt_CoR_issues.htm.
"Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4 th 758, 788
(2011); Agreement for Transfer of Conserved Water By and Between Imperial Irrigation District and San Diego County Water Authority (April 29,
1998), accessed May 13, 2015, http://www.iidcom/Modules/ShowDocument.
aspx?documentid-887 (agreement no longer available).
"Key Terms for Quantification Settlement Among the State of California,
IID, CVWD and MWD (1999), http://www.riversimulator~org/Resources/
LawOfTheRiver/HooverDamDoes/Supplements/ I 999KeyTermsQuantification
Settlement.pdf,
"Colorado River Board of California, California's Colorado River Water Use
Plan (2000), http://www.crb~cagov/programs/Calif-PlanMay ll -Draft.pdf.
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water in California," the plan heralded."' "As we enter the new
millennium, California for the first time will be required to
reduce the amount of Colorado River water it uses." 10 1 In line
with the Key Terms Agreement, the plan identified as its core
"linchpins" quantification of certain entitlements within the
Seven-Party Agreement and implementation of cooperative
water conservation/transfers between agricultural and urban
water users. An additional measure called for by the plan was
the adoption of interim surplus guidelines by the secretary of
the interior.' 2 Tbese guidelines would clarify the circumstances
in which the secretary of the interior would deliver surplus
water to California contractors under the Arizona v. California
decree. They constituted the second key document to emerge at
this time, and Secretary Babbitt adopted them under a "Peace on
the River" banner at a signing ceremony in San Diego in January
2001,1"11 conditioning their effectiveness on the QSA's formation
by December 31, 2002. When this deadline passed unmet, a new
secretary of the interior, Gale Norton, suspended the guidelines
and limited California's water deliveries to 4.4 maf in 2003.104
California had consumed 5.37 maf of Colorado River water in
2002,105 so this reduction did not entail a "soft landing."
After ten months of subsequent negotiations among California contractors, the QSA finally came into being on October 10,
2003.106 Two noteworthy developments occurred during this
final lap, one involving the federal judiciary, the other the California State Legislature.
On the judicial front was a lawsuit filed by the Imperial
Irrigation District in the Southern District of California." 7
The district pursued this suit to challenge the secretary of the

""Ibid., 2.
"o'Ibid.
""U.S. Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River Interim
Surplus Guidelines Final Environmental Impact Statement (January 16, 2001),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/surplus/surplus-rod-final.pdf.
o'aLochhead, "An Upper Basin Perspective," 375.
]'ibid., 399-400.
"'This figure appears on page 1 of U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Reclamation, Compilation of Records in Accordance with Article V of the
Decree of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arizona v. Californiaet
aL dated March 9, 1964, calendar year 2002, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2002DecreeRpt.pdf.
"'Quantification Settlement Agreement and Related Agreements and Documents to which Southern California Agencies Are Signatories (2003), http://
www.,dcwa.org/sites/default/files/files/QSA-final.pdf.
7
1' Lochhead, "An Upper Basin Perspective," 402-404.
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interior's reduction of Colorado River water deliveries to it in
2003. In short, the district successfully obtained a preliminary
injunction in the suit, resulting in an increase in its water use
of approximately 330,000 acre-feet that year and a decrease in
the MWD's water use of roughly 121,000 acre-feet. This counterpoise ensured that California's collective Colorado River
water use did not exceed its 4.4 maf normal entitlement.
In turn, several months after the injunction in the federal
lawsuit had been issued, the California State Legislature
enacted a trio of laws commonly addressing the fate of the
Salton Sea as implicated by the QSA. Comprising this trio were
Senate Bills 277, 317, and 654-collectively referred to as the
"QSA legislation" and devised "to facilitate" the QSA's implementation. 0 Senate Bill 277 was entitled the Salton Sea Restoration Act and expressed the legislature's intent to "undertake
the restoration of the Salton Sea ecosystem and the permanent
protection of the wildlife dependent on that ecosystem." 0 9
This restoration would be based on an alternative developed in
a restoration study that would be funded by moneys deposited
into a Salton Sea Restoration Fund." 0
The second bill in this line, Senate Bill 317, dovetailed with
the first piece of legislation in calling for the secretary of the
California Natural Resources Agency to undertake the Salton
Sea restoration study, including generating a preferred alternative for restoration and a proposed funding plan."' Also imposed by this bill was an obligation on the Imperial Irrigation
District to provide "mitigation water" during the QSA's first
fifteen years-i.e., water to mitigate adverse environmental impacts to the Salton Sea resulting from the agriculture-to-urban
water transfers contemplated by the QSA." 2
In a similar fashion, Senate Bill 654 also broached the subjects of restoration and environmental mitigation. "[I]t is important that actions taken to reduce California's Colorado River
water use are consistent with its commitment to restore the

"'Quantification Settlement Agreement and Related Agreements and Documents to which Southern California Agencies Are Signatories (2003).
" 9 California Senate Bill 277 (September 29, 2003), 2, section 1 (revising subsection 2931(a) of Fish and Game Code), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/
bill/sen/sb-0251-0300/sb277_bill_20030929_chaptered.pdf.
"Ibid., 2-3, section 1 (revising sections 2931 and 2932).
"'California Senate Bill 317 (September 29, 2003), 5, section 1 [revising subsection 2081.7(e)(1) of Fish and Game Code], http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_0301-0350/sb_317_bill20030929_chaptered.pdf.
" Ibid., 3, section 1 [revising subsection 2081.7(c)(2)].
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Salton Sea," provided the bill.'a It then proceeded to explain
how a restoration plan was necessary to prevent the Salton Sea
from becoming too saline to support its fishery and fish-eating
birds, and how the QSA's water transfers could accelerate the
rate of salinization." 4 The bill ultimately called for the Imperial
Irrigation District, the Coachella Valley Water District, and the
SDCWA to contribute $30 million collectively to the Salton
Sea Restoration Fund, and generally provided that any additional restoration actions would be "the sole responsibility of
the State of California."", As for mitigation, the bill explained
that it was "necessary to provide a mechanism to implement
and allocate the environmental mitigation responsibility" between the water agencies and the state in order to implement
the QSA." 6 The specific instrument envisioned for this purpose
was a "joint powers agreement" to be formed by the California
Department of Fish and Game and to include the Coachella
Valley Water District, the Imperial Irrigation District, and the
SDCWA." The bill capped these water agencies' collective
environmental mitigation payments at $133 million."' As
detailed below, it is these restoration and mitigation provisions
within the QSA legislation that, as of the time of this writing,
factor most significantly into the QSA's future.
Although the QSA is referred to in the singular here, the agreement actually consisted of an individual QSA as well as a suite
of related agreements governing the legal rights of California
contractors to use Colorado River water. Included among these
related agreements was an implementing Colorado River Water
Delivery Agreement (CRWDA) forged on October 10, 2003-again, the QSA's signing date-by secretary of the interior Gale
Norton and the Coachella Valley Water District, the Imperial
Irrigation District, the MWD, and the SDCWA.' Also sub"California Senate Bill 654 (September 29, 2003), 3, section 2 [revising subsection 1(c) of Chapter 617 of Statutes of 20021, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0304/bill/sen/sb_0651-0700/sb654_bill_20030929-chaptered.pdf.
"l4Ibid., 4, section 2 [revising subsection 1(f) of Chapter 617 of Statutes of 2002].
"'Ibid., 5, section 3 [revising subsections (1)(b)(2) and (c) of Chapter 617 of
Statutes of 20021.
"Ibid., 4, section 3.
"'Ibid., 4, section 3 [revising subsection (1)(a) of Chapter 617 of Statutes of
2002).
"'Ibid., 5, section 3 [revising subsection (1)(b)(1) of Chapter 617 of Statutes of 20021.
"'U.S. Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River Water
Delivery Agreement, Implementation Agreement, Inadvertent Overrun and
Payback Policy, and Related Federal Actions Final Environmental Impact
Statement (October 10, 2003), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/crwda/
crwdarod.pdf.
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sumed in the mix was a Joint Powers Authority Creation and

Funding Agreement (JPA) prepared to implement the restoration and environmental mitigation provisions of Senate Bill
654.120 Except for the MWD, the water agencies that were
parties to the CRWDA also entered into the JPA, alongside the
California Department of Fish and Game. Regarding Salton Sea
restoration, the JPA (1) established the water agencies' respective financial contributions to the Salton Sea Restoration Fund
(i.e., from the collective $30-million contribution), and (2)
reiterated the state's commitment to both legal and financial
coverage of any costs above this amount. 21 As for mitigation,
the JPA likewise (1) outlined the water agencies' respective
financial contributions for environmental mitigation (i.e., from
the collective $133-million contribution), and (2) specified that
the state of California would bear as an "unconditional contractual obligation" any costs in excess of this limit. 2 2

Situated within its proverbial nest of implementing instruments, the QSA was generally described as a consensual
agreement among three parties-the Imperial Irrigation District, the Coachella Valley Water District, and the MWD-that
served to resolve "longstanding disputes regarding the priority,
use (including quantification), and transferability of Colorado
River water." 23 As already discussed at length, the agreement
responded to the other Basin States' and the secretary of the interior's "insistence that California must implement a strategy
that [would enable] the State to limit its use of Colorado River
water to 4.4 MAF during a normal year."' 2 4 Although it encompassed a range of measures toward this end, the QSA's linchpins were those of the 1999 Key Terms Agreement: (1) quantification of certain entitlements in the Seven-Party Agreement,
and (2) facilitation of agriculture-to-urban water transfers via
conservation/transfer agreements.
With regard to quantification, the QSA addressed two priorities within the Seven-Party Agreement that had lacked specificity since 1931. Extending from priority 3(a) of that agreement,
the QSA established basic caps of 3.1 maf and 330,000 acrefeet, respectively, for the Imperial Irrigation District's and the
n2 Quantification Settlement Agreement, Joint Powers Authority Creation and
Funding Agreement (October 10, 2003), http://www.sdcwa.org/sites/default/
files/files/QSA jpa-funding.pdf.
12 lbid., 15-16.

12,2 bid., 11.
mU.S. Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River Water
Delivery Agreement (October 10, 2003).
24

Ibid.
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Coachella Valley Water District's annual use of Colorado River
water."' Similarly, based on forbearance agreements, the QSA
prescribed a pecking order for annual water allocations associated with priority 6(a) of the Seven-Party Agreement: (1) 38,000
acre-feet to the MWD, (2) 63,000 acre-feet to the Imperial
Irrigation District, and (3) 119,000 acre-feet to the Coachella
Valley Water District.' 2 Although not comparably opaque,
the QSA also capped the MWD's use of Colorado River water
under priorities four and five of the Seven-Party Agreement at
550,000 and 662,000 acre-feet per year, respectively. 2 1
Intertwined with the basic caps on consumptive use of
priority 3(a) water by the Imperial Irrigation District and the
Coachella Valley Water District were a host of conservation
and transfer agreements that served to reduce or augment these
parties' entitlements.' These agreements included the 1988
IID-MWD and the 1998 IID-SDCWA transfers discussed earlier.
Also appearing in the mix were measures that called for lining of portions of the All-American Canal and the Coachella
Canal, and transfers of water conserved by this lining to parties
to the San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement. All told,
the QSA contemplated that these and related measures would
alter the intrastate allocation of California's normal entitlement [specifically, priority 3(a) water] in the manner shown
below in Table 2. The Imperial Irrigation District is projected
to consume roughly 2.6 maf of this water annually by the time
the QSA expires in 2077 at the latest. Similarly, although the
Seven-Party Agreement provides for 3.85 maf of annual consumptive use under its first three priorities, the QSA is projected to reduce this amount to approximately 3.47 maf. This
nearly 400,000-acre-foot reduction provides critical security for
the MWD-again, an entity whose 662,000-acre-foot entitlement under priority five of the Seven-Party Agreement falls
squarely outside California's 4.4 maf normal entitlement.
Although the intricacies of the QSA's formation and composition surveyed up to this point alone provide ample food
for thought, they do not fully bring the intrastate chronicle up
to date. Will the QSA remain in effect to govern allocation of

*Quantification Settlement Agreement and Related Agreements and Documents to which Southern California Agencies Are Signatories (2003).
6
Ihbid.
2
71bid., 12.
"Ibid., 10-13. For a useful overview of these agreements, see U.S. Department
of the Interior, Final Environmental Impact Statement, Implementation Agreement, Inadvertent Overrun and Payback Policy, and Related Federal Actions
(2012), http://www.usbrgov/1c/region/g4000/FEIS/Volume%201.pdf.
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TABLE 2. QSA Quantifications and Transfers. (Courtesy of U.S.
Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River
Water Delivery Agreement, Implementation Agreement, Inadvertent
Overrun and Payback Policy, and Related Federal Actions Final
Environmental Impact Statement [20031, 33)

California's share of Colorado River water? Underlying this
existential question is a thick post-2003 trajectory of QSA-related developments on which this narrative must shed at least
modest light.'2 9
As an initial matter, it would probably be naive to assume
that an agreement as crucial as the QSA would escape litigation by dissident California interests, and events over the past
decade bear out this view. Described by the California Court of
Appeals as a "battle royal" 30 and a "tsunami,"' 3 litigation now
exceeding in length the eleven-year trail in Arizona v. California has been winding its way through the state and federal
'72The author wishes to express his gratitude to attorneys Antonio Rossmann
(previously counsel for Imperial County) and Patrick Redmond (currently counsel for Imperial Irrigation District) for taking time to discuss contemporary
developments involving the QSA litigation and Salton Sea. Any errors in the
discussion are solely my own.
"County of Imperial v. SuperiorCourt, 152 Cal. App. 4th113, 18 (2007).
"'Imperial County Air Pollution Control District v. State Water Resources
ControlBoard, 2013 WL 2605470 at 1 (June 12, 2013).
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courts ever since the QSA's formation in 2003. Of greatest
import, nine related cases were consolidated into a coordinated
QSA proceeding in 2004 that has been administered by the Sacramento County Superior Court.a2 Three of these cases make

up the core of the QSA litigation: (1) an action by the Imperial
Irrigation District to validate the QSA and related agreements;
(2) an action by Imperial County asserting violations of the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the Water
Code in connection with the QSA; and (3) an action by an environmental organization, Protect Our Water and Environmental
Rights (POWER), and other parties also asserting CEQA violations. Three major decisions have been handed down in these
cases thus far-two from the Sacramento County Superior
Court in 2010 and 2013,-3 and one from the California Court
of Appeals in 2011.134 The upshot of the litigation appears to be
twofold. First, the QSA has been validated, surviving perhaps
most notably a state constitutional challenge to the JPA-specifically, the "unconditional contractual obligation" borne by
the state under it for environmental mitigation costs exceeding the water agencies' collective $133-million contribution.',"
Second, the QSA also has persisted through the CEQA and
Water Code actions, which have included several challenges to
environmental review processes addressing the QSA's impacts
on the Salton Sea (e.g., its restoration).'3 6
The last particular lingering thread in the QSA litigation at
present seems to be a cross-appeal to the Sacramento County
Superior Court's decision on July 31, 2013. Filed the month
following this decision, the superior court's validation and
CEQA holdings initially prompted appeals by Imperial County

"'Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Quantification Settlement
Agreement (QSA) Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4353,
http://www.saccourt.ca.gov/coordinated-cases/qsa/qsa.aspx.
33
Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Statement of Decision
Following Phase LA Trial, Coordinated Proceeding, case no.: JC4353 (January 13,
2010), http://chanceofrain.com/wp-content/uploads/20 10/01 /jc4353-qsa-statement-of-decision.htm; Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento,
Statement of Decision, QSA Coordinated Civil Cases, case no. JCCP 4353
(July 31, 2013).
134QuantificationSettlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 45 758 (2011).
13 5Ibid., 796-812.
"'Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, Statement of Decision,
QSA Coordinated Civil Cases, case no. JCCP 4353 (July 31, 2013), 37-96. The
Ninth Circuit also rejected challenges to the QSA under the Clean Air Act and
National Environmental Policy Act in People of the State of California v. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, case no. 12-55856 (9" Cit. 2014), http://sdcwa.org/sites/default/files/files/federal-QSA-9th-CircuitOpinion.pdf.
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and POWER, among other parties.1 3 7 The Imperial Irrigation
District eventually entered into settlement agreements with
each of these parties in August 2014 and March 2015, however,
such that the appeals have now either been dismissed or appear
en route to that destination. 38 Almost (but not quite) the same
thing can be said for a cross-appeal filed by the SDCWA, the
MWD, the Coachella Valley Water District, and others. It is
still live for the time being and generally raises jurisdictional
challenges to the superior court's decision that are founded on
principles of sovereign immunity and preemption. '3 Nonetheless, by its own terms, the cross-appeal appears short-lived,
since it requests the court of appeals to affirm the superior
court and to consider the jurisdictional issues only if the higher
court were to reverse the validation and CEQA holdings.'4 In
sum, the QSA litigation seems to be slowly grinding to a halt.
Given the seemingly short shelf life of the QSA litigation
going forward, only one other key variable appears poised
to potentially jeopardize the QSA and its patchwork on the
intrastate allocation framework: the Salton Sea. Notwithstanding the recurring emphasis on restoration and environmental
mitigation in the QSA legislation and elsewhere, the state of
California has not yet implemented and funded a restoration
plan for the sea, nearly a dozen years after the QSA's formation.
The Imperial Irrigation District has been delivering mitigation
flows throughout this period-an obligation prescribed by Senate Bill 317 as well as a 2002 order issued by the State Water
Resources Control Board conditionally authorizing the 1998
IID-SDCWA transfer.' 4 ' These mitigation flows are scheduled
to cease in 2017, however, and grave concerns have been
raised based on this sunset about environmental impacts and
',"The notices of appeal and related information about the case (case no.
C074592) can be accessed through the court of appeals case information system
at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist-3&docid=2055075&docno=C074592.
',Ibid.; Imperial Irrigation District, "IID Reaches Settlement Agreement with
QSA Litigants," news release, September 16, 2014, http://iid.com/Home/
Components/News/News/416/30?arch=1; Imperial Irrigation District, "lID
and Imperial County Announce QSA Coordinated Cases Settlement," news
release, February 3, 2015, http://www.iid.com/Home/Components/News/
News/431/30?arch=1.
'Respondents and Cross-Appellants San Diego County Water Authority, Vista
Irrigation District and City of Escondido's Joint Combined Cross-Appellants'
Reply Brief (August 25, 2014).
u-Ibid., 40.
14 State of California, State Water Resources Control Board, Revised Order
WRO 2002-0013 (December 20, 2002), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board decisions/adopted-orders/orders/2002/wro2002-16.pdf.
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corresponding costs associated with not having a restoration
plan in place. A 2014 report by the Pacific Institute estimated
"inaction costs" through 2047 of $3 billion to $37 billion
related to public health, $400 million to $7 billion related to
property devaluation, $110 million to $150 million related to
recreation, and $10 billion to $26 billion related to ecological
values.'42 Also highlighted (but unquantified) as an inaction
cost in the report was diminished agricultural productivity.
It was against this backdrop of unfulfilled Salton Sea restoration and waning mitigation water that the Imperial Irrigation
District in November 2014 submitted a petition to the control
board requesting two forms of relief pertaining to the sea.',
"[Alithough the obligation to restore the Sea belongs to the
State alone," explained the petition, the district requested the
control board "to order the QSA parties and Salton Sea Authority member agencies to meet and confer in good faith in an effort to achieve consensus around a realistic, feasible restoration
plan and mechanism for funding it."' 4 4 In turn, extending from
this collaborative effort, the district sought a second form of relief that, if granted, would hold significant implications for the
QSA's future. As requested by the district, "the Board should issue an order modifying its 2002 Order"-again, the order issued
in 2002 conditionally authorizing the 1998 IID-SDCWA transfer-"to add State implementation and funding of [the] restora4 Simply
tion plan as a condition of transfers under the QSA."6
put, "the State must restore the Sea as a condition of the QSA
transfers," contended the petition, expressing elsewhere in its
text the district's hope "that cooperative dialogue and proceedings before the Board can obviate any possible litigation regarding restoration of the Sea."' 4 6

On March 18, 2015, the control board held a public workshop in response to the Imperial Irrigation District's petition,
and as of the time of this writing this event marks the van-

'"Pacific Institute, Hazard'sToll: The Costs of Inaction at the Salton Sea
(2014), v-vii, http://pacinst.org/publication/hazards-toll/.
'"'Imperial Irrigation District, "H1D Petitions State Water Board to Take Action
at the Salton Sea," news release, November 18, 2014, http://38.106.5.247/
Home/Components/News/News/425/30?arch-1.
"4 State of California, State Water Resources Control Board, Petition of Imperial
Irrigation District for Modification of Revised Water Rights Order 2002-0013
(November 18, 2014), 48, http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/waterissues/programs/salton sea/docs/iidpetition.pdf.
"'Ibid., 50.
"Ibid., 30, 44 (italics in original).
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guard of QSA-related developments in this domain."' A notice issued by the control board made clear that its convening
of the workshop did "not reflect a conclusion that changes to
the [2002 orderj would be an appropriate way to address issues
concerning restoration of the Salton Sea.""" The notice likewise flagged as an issue for discussion at the workshop how
making the transfer permitted by the 2002 order contingent
on Salton Sea restoration might "unravel the complex series of
agreements that make up the QSA, which would have significant water supply implications for the State."'"' Complementing testimony offered at the workshop, parties submitted a
wide range of comment letters to the control board in support
of, and in opposition to, the petition both before and after the
event." A full discussion of these letters would go beyond
this article's scope, but, broadly speaking, solid support came
from the environmental community, while staunch opposition
came from the water agencies on the receiving end of the 1998
IID-SDCWA transfer: the SDCWA, the Coachella Valley Water
District, and the MWD.
The punch line to this continuous drama over California's
intrastate allocation framework for Colorado River water is
that the QSA currently is intact. It is performing the clutch
interstate function of enabling California to live within the
bounds of its 4.4 maf normal entitlement announced in Arizona v. California. Despite the apparently impending close of
litigation comparable in length to the Supreme Court's historic
suit, what lies ahead for the QSA nonetheless appears less than
fully clear given the status of Salton Sea restoration and the
Imperial Irrigation District's associated petition. A point that
does appear beyond dispute at this juncture, however, is that
if the QSA parties "thought they were buying peace ... they
were sorely mistaken." Justice Ronald Robie explained this
elegantly in 2011: "[Al drop of water cannot do two things at
once, and every drop residents of coastal Southern California

"4'Portions of testimony offered at the public workshop can be viewed at
https://www.youtube.com/watchv-mYGUZTolidA.
I'State of California, State Water Resources Control Board, Notice of Public
Workshop, Solicitation of Comments Regarding the Status of the Salton Sea
and Revised Order WRO 2002-0013 (February 6, 2015), 1, http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water issues/programs/saltonsea/docs/notice_saltonsea031815.pdf,

"Ibid., 3.
"These comments can be accessed via the letters links of the State Water Resources Control Board's Salton Sea webpage, http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/

waterrights/water ssues/programs/salton sea/.
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want to drink is one that cannot be used to sustain the endangered Salton Sea,"'-'
SHORTAGE SHARING IN THE

ERA

OF LIMITS

One monumental fact not yet highlighted in the evolution
of California's intrastate allocation framework, and the Lower
Basin and basin-wide frameworks within which it is nested,
concerns the onset of a historic drought in the Colorado River
Basin beginning in 2000. This drought has forced innovations
at the intrastate, interstate, and basin-wide levels that have
paralleled the QSA's formation and the ensuing wave of conflicts. Just as the QSA evolved in 2003 to clarify the SevenParty Agreement's scheme for allocating Colorado River water
in California, so too did a similarly functioning instrument
appear in 2007 to navigate this potentially game-changing dry
spell: the "Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin
Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and
Lake Mead" (Interim Guidelines).152 These guidelines have influenced California's use of the Colorado River in diverse ways.
It was shortly before the California 4.4 Plan's formation in
2000 that severe drought conditions gripped the Colorado River
Basin and precipitated crisp relations among the Basin States.
As described by the Bureau of Reclamation upon the Interim
Guidelines' adoption in 2007, "the eight-year period from 2000
through 2007 was the driest eight-year period in the 100-year
historical record of the Colorado River."''a Vividly illustrating
this pattern were declining reservoir storage levels throughout
the basin. "From October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2007,
storage in Colorado River reservoirs decreased from 55.8 maf
(approximately 94 percent of capacity) to 32.1 maf (approximately 54 percent of capacity)."" Given the Basin States' extensive reliance on Colorado River water-particularly within the
Lower Basin-the initially adversarial dynamic fostered by the
drought may seem commonsensical. In 2005, after several years
of coping with the drought, "tensions among the Basin States
`QuantificationSettlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4*11 758, 773
12011).
m 2U.S. Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River Interim
Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead (2007), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.
!lbid., 6.

1" 4 Ibid.
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brought the basin closer to multi-state and inter-basin litigation
than perhaps any time since the adoption of the Compact."
Issuance of a directive by the secretary of the interior in
2005 served as a major turning point in the transition from
adversarial to collaborative relations during the Interim Guidelines' formation. Preceding this directive was an October 2004
letter from the governors' representatives of the Upper Division states to their counterparts in the Lower Division states
describing how "[dieclining reservoir levels have raised fundamental issues associated with the allocations established under
the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project
Act as interpreted by the decree in Arizona v. California, and
the Mexican Treaty."'5 6 Stating that "these issues will not go

away," the letter identified the "fundamental issue" as the
Upper Division states' obligation to contribute flows toward
Mexico's treaty entitlement under Article 111(c) of the compact."" Formal dialogue was needed on this matter and others.
Roughly six months after this letter was sent, a disagreement
arose among the Basin States regarding annual reservoir operations. On May 2, 2005, the secretary issued a directive responding to this disagreement, calling for consultation followed by a
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process that eventually would produce the Interim Guidelines in December 2007.161
Embarked on by the Bureau of Reclamation one month after
the secretary of the interior's directive, the NEPA process that
yielded the Interim Guidelines involved broad-based participation by the Basin States and other stakeholders. The focus of
the NEPA process was twofold: (1) development of guidelines
that would clarify the circumstances in which the secretary
would declare a shortage in the Lower Basin and reduce deliveries to the Lower Division states under the Arizona v. California decree, and (2) development of coordinated management

'*Ibid.
"'Letterfrom the States of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming Governor's Representatives on Colorado River Operations, October 7, 2004, http://
www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/mtgs/04oct2/Attach-12.pdf. W. Patrick
Schiffer et al., "From a Colorado River Compact Challenge to the Next Era of
Cooperation among the Seven Basin States," Arizona Law Review 49 (2007):
217-33.
"Ilbid.
"'Secretary of the interior Gale A. Norton to Honorable Jon Huntsman,
Jr., governor of Utah, May 2, 2005, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/
AOP2005/DOIDecision.pdf.
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strategies for the operation of Lake Powell and Lake Mead.'69
With input from the Basin States and other parties throughout 2005 and 2006, the secretary issued a draft environmental
impact statement in February 2007, incorporating into this
document a "Basin States Alternative." In subsequent correspondence following the draft statement's release, the Basin
States described how they had made "tremendous progress
over the last two years in setting aside contentious issues and
reaching agreements regarding operation of the Colorado River
system reservoirs." 60 The Bureau of Reclamation released a final environmental impact statement six months later,'' which
was followed by a Record of Decision on December 13, 2007.62
As cast in their final form, the Interim Guidelines included
a host of provisions at the basin-wide, interstate, and intrastate
levels relevance to California's use of Colorado River water.
At the basin-wide level, the guidelines adopted a coordinated
operating scheme for Lake Powell and Lake Mead that would
control the amount of water released from Lake Powell into the
Lower Colorado River each year.',' These annual releases from
the Upper Division states again are the primary source on
which Southern California water users rely. The guidelines'
scheme was composed to hinge the amount of these annual
releases on the relative water levels of Lake Powell and Lake
Mead during a particular year. Historically, the minimum annual release had been 8.23 maf, but the guidelines authorized
releases as low as 7.0 maf in certain circumstances. Traced to
its root within the Law of the River, the guidelines' scheme
was devised to implement for an interim period (up to 2026)

'mU.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Reservoir Operations: Development of Lower Basin Shortage Guidelines and Coordinated Management Strategies for Lake Powell and Lake Mead Under Low
Reservoir Conditions, Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 189 (September 30, 2005),
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/news/FRnoticeSeptO5.pdf.
'mOLetter from the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming Governors' Representatives on Colorado River Operations to Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne, April 30, 2007, http://www.
ose.state.nm.us/Basins/Colorado/PDF/1-TransmittalLetter-pdf.
'6 1U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Final Environmental
Impact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2007), http://
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/.
'6 2U.S. Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, Colorado River Interim
Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead (2007), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.
' 5 Ibid., 49-53.
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the Upper Division states' flow obligations under Article III c)
and (d) of the Colorado River Compact.
Complementing the coordinated operating scheme, the
Interim Guidelines also outlined a regime for Lake Mead's operation in normal, surplus, and shortage conditions as defined
by the Arizona v. California decree."' Broadly speaking, Lake
Mead's water level would dictate what type of conditions the
secretary of the interior would declare each year. In the event
of a shortage, the guidelines would allow for annual releases
as low as 7.0 maf from Lake Mead, with 2.32 maf and 280,000
acre-feet available for consumptive use in Arizona and Nevada,
respectively. California's 4.4 maf normal entitlement would
remain untouched in this situation; a shortage declaration
would not cut into it at all. On the other end of the spectrum,
the guidelines' rules for allocating surplus water among the
Lower Division states supplanted those that had been adopted
in the interim surplus guidelines in 2001. Among other things,
these revised rules earmarked surplus water for the MWD during a "domestic surplus" and adhered to the Seven-Party Agreement's intrastate priority system for surplus water deliveries
during a "quantified surplus."
An additional aspect of the Interim Guidelines worth noting
in relation to California's contractors (and those elsewhere in
the Lower Basin) is a water banking program for "intentionally created surplus" (ICS).1 65 This program was founded on the
basic premise that these contractors could engage in activities
like land fallowing, canal lining, desalination, etc., that would
enable them to rely on the water generated by these activities
in lieu of some of the mainstream water that they otherwise
would use under their contracts. In turn, the contractors could
store this unused water in Lake Mead for later use, subject to
certain limits. Among these limits were caps on the annual
and cumulative amounts of ICS created by contractors in each
Lower Division state, as well as a cap on the amount of ICS
that could be delivered annually. On the same day the Interim
Guidelines were adopted, California contractors-including the
MWD, the Imperial Irrigation District, and the Coachella Valley Water District-signed an intrastate agreement that defined
their individual caps in each of these respects. " This agreement notably disclaimed any effect on the QSA.
'"ibid., 34-37.
6
61bid., 38-43.
"California Agreement for the Creation and Delivery of Extraordinary Conservation Intentionally Created Surplus (December 13, 2007), http://wwwusbr.
gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/agreements/CAICS.pdf.
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In sum, the secretary of the interior has relied on the Interim
Guidelines since 2007 to operate Lake Powell and Lake Mead,
and the drought in the Colorado River Basin has yet to abate.
Although the ICS program is noteworthy for the flexibility it
affords California's contractors under the intrastate scheme,
arguably even more salient parts of the guidelines are the reservoir operating regimes. The final environmental impact statement prepared for the guidelines identified a 41-percent chance
of an "involuntary shortage" along the Lower Colorado River
while these regimes were in effect (until December 31, 2025).167
Such a shortage has yet to be declared, but it should be noted
that for the first time since its filling in the 1960s the Bureau of
Reclamation released from Lake Powell only 7.48 maf this past
year.'^6 Moreover, in April 2015, the bureau reportedly projected
the chances of shortage declarations along the Lower Colorado
River as 33 percent and 75 percent during 2016 and 2017, respectively.' 69 If this shortage scenario plays out-in 2016, 2017,
or otherwise-Arizona and Nevada contractors again will bear
the brunt. As mentioned, although California did not prevail in
Arizona v. California, the Interim Guidelines fully insulate its
4.4 maf normal entitlement from shortage declarations.
CONCLUSION

If we treat as bookends the Colorado River Compact's formation in 1922 and the ongoing QSA-related developments and
implementation of the Interim Guidelines, the evolution of the
allocation framework governing Southern California's use of
Colorado River water encompasses nearly one hundred years of
western legal history. Apparent across this period is an iterative and provisional pattern and a resulting diversity of nested
allocational institutions that make this evolutionary process
"6U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Final Environmental
Impact Statement, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (2007), ES-25,
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/.
''Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region, "Bureau of Reclamation

Forecasts Lower Water Release from Lake Powell to Lake Mead for 2014," press
release, August 16, 2013, http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.
cfm?RecordlD=44245; U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,
Annual Operating Plan for Colorado River Reservoirs 2015 (2014), 17, http://
www.usbr.gov/uc/water/rsvrs/ops/aop/AOPl5.pdf.
'^Tony Davis, "Risk of CAP Shortages Next Year Reach 33%," Arizona Daily
Star, April 29, 2015, http://tueson.com/news/science/environment/risks-of-capshortages-next-year-hit/article_7feb966b-6aI7-5bc7-b2cl-057b9b70c00a.html.
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resemblant in principle (though perhaps not in scale) to that of
almost any legal regime ever devised for governance of water
resources. Such regimes might be conceived of as sandcastles,
and the myriad forces within society that perpetually shape
their rule-laden structures might be analogized to the tide.
Tangible examples of the iterative and provisional nature
of this evolution abound. Consider initially the relationship
between the compact and the Interim Guidelines in this regard.
Prescribing the Upper Division states' flow obligations to the
Lower Division states and to Mexico, Article 111(c) and (d) of
the compact have eluded Supreme Court interpretation since
their genesis. Notwithstanding their less-than-clear meaning
in certain key respects for almost a century (and derivative tensions among the Basin States), however, these flow obligations
have been implemented on the ground since 2007 through the
Interim Guidelines' coordinated operating scheme for Lake
Powell and Lake Mead. A similar pattern can be discerned in
the Boulder Canyon Project Act's history. It is respectfully
questionable whether Congress indeed intended to establish
an apportionment scheme for the Lower Colorado River when
enacting the Project Act in 1928. Thirty-five years after this
milestone, however-i.e., after thirty-five years of living with
uncertainty regarding the Project Act's precise meaning and
relationship with the compact-the Supreme Court pragmatically laid these issues to rest in Arizona v. California.
Another salient example in this vein concerns the SevenParty Agreement. Its intrastate priority system for California's
use of Colorado River water would have benefited from clarity upon its inception in 1931, particularly with regard to the
scope of the Imperial Irrigation District's and the Coachella
Valley Water District's entitlements under priority 3(a). Yet it
took a sustained interstate and intrastate effort to formulate
the QSA for this purpose in 2003, and even now, a dozen years
later, the QSA's fate is unfolding with that of the Salton Sea.
By way of synthesis, a common trend is evident from the
"lives" of each of these allocation institutions bearing on
Southern California's use of the Colorado River. They have
originated without an entirely clear (or at least fully shared)
understanding of their meaning and intended operation. They
nonetheless have governed water allocation and management
and related infrastructural and capital investment decisions
in and around the Colorado River Basin until various tipping
points have been reached requiring their clarification or modification. They then have been subject to triage-like work generally involving large-scale concerted efforts by diverse federal
and state entities (executive, judicial, and/or legislative) at
both the interstate and intrastate levels. In a nutshell, when
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considered across the long arc of time, the persistence of these
institutions within the history of western water law has had
everything to do with the iterative and provisional manner in
which they have been finessed.
A corollary to the preceding point is also notable concerning
the diversity and interconnectedness of the allocation institutions that govern Southern California's Colorado River water
use. A detailed recitation of the features of these institutions
would not be prudent this late in the game, but it is enough
to say generally that they demonstrate incredible variation
in their makeup. This variation is apparent in their allocation schemes-e.g., the compact's scheme for the Colorado
River system as a whole versus the Arizona v. California
decree's scheme for the Lower Colorado River. This variation
also is evident from the administrative arrangements for the
allocation schemes-e.g., the absence of a formal basin-wide
commission for the compact's scheme contrasted with the
secretary of the interior's watermaster role for the scheme set
forth in the Arizona v. Californiadecree. Despite their diversity
in these respects and others, however, these institutions obviously are inescapably joined. It is the entire integrated framework
constituted by the compact, the Arizona v Californiadecree, the
Seven-Party Agreement, the QSA, and related measures that
collectively governs Southern California's use of the Colorado
River. Simply put, the evolution chronicled above has generated in contemporary times a nested collection of diverse allocation institutions with rich insights for water laws elsewhere in
the United States and across the globe.
Ultimately, given the particular contours of the allocation institutions that have originated through this iterative
and provisional evolution, California's legal entitlement to
Colorado River water has emerged comparatively secure from
an interstate perspective as of 2015. Ever since the compact's
formation in 1922, California has enjoyed its status as a beneficiary of the Upper Division states' decadal obligation under
Article II(d) to avoid depleting Lee's Ferry flows below 75.0
maf. Moving forward four decades, despite the outcome in Arizona v. California, California nonetheless was able to ensure
primacy for its 4.4 maf normal entitlement to Colorado River
water (i.e., over Arizona's CAP entitlement) through the Colorado River Basin Project Act in 1968. Finally, coming about
in 2007 in response to ongoing drought in the basin, there is
again the Interim Guidelines' operating regime for Lake Mead.
In the event of future shortages along the Lower Colorado
River, this regime calls for cutting into Arizona's and Nevada's
entitlements-the former's by as much as almost 500,000 acrefeet-while leaving California's 4.4 maf normal entitlement
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wholly untouched. One may inquire about the equity of these
allocational arrangements-particularly, in light of the textual
importance ascribed to "equity" within the Law of the River's
constitution (compact).170 At this stage of the institutional evolution, however, the relative security of Southern California's
entitlement seems clear.
A return to the statement quoted at the outset of this article
from Secretary of the Interior Wilbur on July 7, 1930, upon
commencement of Hoover Dam's construction, is appropriate
to close. It is apparent that the historical process canvassed in
the preceding pages largely has realized the vision then articulated by the secretary for California and the U.S. Southwest."'
People hold diverse normative views on this subject in modern
times, but Hoover Dam and the vast infrastructure governed by
the Law of the River indeed have made "new geography" and
ushered in a "new era in the southwestern part of the United
1
States.""

2

Even more germane to the focus of this piece, the

Imperial Irrigation District has benefitted from the "new hope"
and "new financial credit" alluded to by the secretary, and the
large-scale importation of Colorado River water to Southern
California's urban coast has made possible "homes and industries ... for many millions of people." 3 Future Lee's Ferry
flows, as supplied by the Upper Division states under Article
111(c) and (d) of the compact, will be a key variable to watch in
successive visions implicating California's use of the Colorado
River. The Interim Guidelines now implement these flow
obligations-as well as govern shortage sharing in the Lower
Basin-but their 2026 sunset is little more than a decade away.
Also warranting close attention, of course, will be the QSA's
intrastate juggling act. Will it be possible to reconcile the competing visions associated with undertaking the largest water
transfer in U.S. history while simultaneously restoring California's largest lake and one of the world's largest inland seas?
Time will tell, and that is the takeaway. What appears most
clear from the historical record is that Southern California's
ongoing use of Colorado River water will remain deeply intertwined with ever-shifting economic, environmental, political,
and social conditions in the state and across the basin, and
that these dynamic changes will ensure that today's allocation
framework inevitably will evolve into tomorrow's.
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